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I.  Introduction 
 
 In Alabama v. North Carolina,
1
 the Southeast Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Management Compact and its member states brought an 
action in the U.S. Supreme Court against North Carolina, alleging a breach 
of the Compact after North Carolina failed to obtain the license necessary to 
open a waste storage facility,
2
 and later failed to comply with sanctions 
                                                 
   Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law 
 1.  Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2295 (2010). 
 2.  See id. at 2300 (stating that "[t]he complaint sets forth claims of violation of 
Plaintiffs' rights under the Compact (Count I), breach of contract (Count II), unjust 
enrichment (Count III), promissory estoppel (Count IV), and money had and received 
(Count V)"). 
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levied against it.
3
  The U.S. Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special 
Master, who filed two reports.
4
  The Court overruled all nine exceptions to 
the Special Master's reports filed by the respective parties, and adopted the 
Special Master's recommendations.
5
  The Court held that the terms of the 
Compact did not allow for monetary sanctions,
6
 and that North Carolina 






 Pursuant to the Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate 
Compact Consent Act,
8
 the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Management Compact was formed in 1986 for the purpose of 
"develop[ing] new facilities for the long-term disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste generated within the region."
9
  A facility located in 
Barnwell, South Carolina was designated as the Compact's initial waste 
disposal site.
10
   
 The South Carolina facility was slated to cease operating as the 
Compact's disposal site in 1992.  The Commission administering the 
Compact designated North Carolina as the host state for a new waste 
facility to replace the South Carolina site at the end of 1992.
11
  North 
Carolina requested financial assistance for licensing and building the 
facility, and the commission obliged the state's request, creating an 
                                                 
 3.  Id. at 2304. 
 4.  See id. at 2300–01 (explaining what the reports contained). "[G]ranting North 
Carolina's cross-motion to dismiss Count I . . . denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss 
. . . Counts II-V . . . denying Plaintiff's motion . . . and granting North Carolina's motion for 
summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary 
judgment on . . . remaining claims in Counts III-V."  
 5.  Id. at 2316. 
 6.  Id. at 2306–08. 
 7.  See id. at 2309–12 (finding that North Carolina took appropriate steps towards 
obtaining licensing, and that the state was not required to bear the financial burden of 
licensing alone, given that the history of the Compact was one of "shared financial 
burdens"). 
 8.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (2006) (permitting state governments to enter into 
regional radioactive waste disposal compacts, which they would not have been able to do 
absent congressional action). 
 9.  See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2302–03 (2010) (describing the 
origins of the Compact, and listing its member states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia). 
 10.  Id. at 2303.  
 11.  Id.  
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assistance fund.
12
  Although it complied with its duties, North Carolina was 
unable to complete the task on time.
13
   
 In July 1995 South Carolina withdrew from the Compact, depriving 
the Compact of further revenues from the Barnwell waste disposal 
facility.
14
  In 1997, the Commission ceased financial assistance to North 
Carolina.
15
  In December of that same year, North Carolina informed the 
Commission it would commence an orderly shutdown of its licensing 
project.
16
  In 1999, two Compact member states, Florida and Tennessee, 
filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that North Carolina had 
failed to fulfill its obligations under the Compact, and requesting the return 
of the nearly $80 million in funding given to North Carolina by the 
Commission, plus interest, damages, and attorney's fees.
17
  North Carolina 
responded by withdrawing from the Compact.
18
 
   In December 1999, the Commission held a sanctions hearing and 
found that North Carolina had failed to meet its obligations under the 
Compact.
19
  The Commission adopted a resolution demanding that North 
Carolina repay the approximately $80 million in funding it had received, 
with interest, to the Commission, as well as a $10 million penalty and 
attorney's fees.
20
  North Carolina refused to do so, and in July 2000, the 







  The Court overruled all seven of the plaintiffs‘ exceptions to the 
Special Master‘s report.  The Court held that the terms of the Compact did 
not allow for monetary sanctions or designate the Commission as sole 
arbiter of disputes.
22
  The Compact specifically enumerated a number of 
sanctions, and the Court found the absence of any provision specifically 
                                                 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See id. (explaining why North Carolina was unable to finish on time).  "The 
estimate in 1989 was . . . $21 million and . . . two years to obtain a license . . . [t]hat proved 
to be wildly optimistic . . . [b]y . . . 1994 the estimate was $112.5 million . . . by December 
1996 the estimated cost had increased by . . . $27 million and the projected [licensing] date 
. . . had become August 2000."     
 14.  Id. at 2304. 
 15.  Id. at 2304. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 2304–05. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 2306–08. 
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authorizing monetary sanctions determinative.
23
  Further, the Compact was 
void of any express terms designating the Commission as sole arbiter of 
disputes, and the Court found that it was thus not bound by the 
Commission‘s decision.
24
   
 The Court found that the terms of the Compact did not require North 
Carolina to take any and all steps to license a waste disposal facility, but did 
establish that North Carolina was not expected to proceed with the costly 
licensing process without external financial assistance—―The history of the 
Compact consists entirely of shared financial burdens.‖
25
  North Carolina 
took the necessary and appropriate steps to obtain the license, was within its 
rights to refuse further action without financial assistance from the 
Commission, and did not breach an implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing when it withdrew from the Compact.
26
   
 In addition, the Court also overruled both of North Carolina‘s 
exceptions to the Special Master‘s report.
27
  The Court held that it was 
reasonable for the Special Master to deny North Carolina's motion for 





IV. Future Implications 
 
 Alabama v. North Carolina highlights the complications that can arise 
from the disposal of radioactive materials.  Waste disposal is just one of 
many issues complicating the use of nuclear power to provide energy to 
U.S. consumers.  North Carolina was designated as a host state by the 
Commission in 1986,
29
 and over a decade later the State still had not 
obtained the requisite license or completed construction of the waste 
facility
30
—this in spite of the fact that the Court found North Carolina to 
have behaved appropriately in pursuing its obligations under the terms of 
the Compact.
31
   
                                                 
 23.  Id. at 2306. 
 24.  Id. at 2308. 
 25.  Id. at 2309. 
 26.  See id. at 2309–12 (finding that North Carolina took appropriate steps towards 
obtaining licensing, and that the state was not required to bear the financial burden of 
licensing alone, given that the history of the Compact was one of "shared financial 
burdens"). 
 27.  Id. at 2313–2316. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 2302. 
 30.  Id. at 2304. 
 31.  See id.  at 2309–12 (finding that North Carolina took appropriate steps towards 
obtaining licensing, and that the state was not required to bear the financial burden of 
licensing alone, given that the history of the Compact was one of "shared financial 
burdens"). 
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 The Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 
Compact is not the only such compact to run into trouble.  Despite the 
passage of both the Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate 
Compact Consent Act and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as 
well as "significant incentives offered by the federal government" since the 
1980s, "[t]he states have failed to create a nationwide system of regional 
low-level radioactive waste . . . disposal sites."
32
  Moreover, as Justice 
O'Conner pointed out in New York v. United States,
33
 low-level radioactive 
waste includes "[r]adioactive material . . . present in luminous watch dials, 
smoke alarms, measurement devices, medical fluids, research materials, and 
the protective gear and construction materials used by workers at nuclear 
power plants."
34
  The inability of the states to effectively deal with the 
disposal of only low-level radioactive waste foreshadows the problems 
certain to arise from the disposal of increased radioactive waste that would 
accompany any future increase in the nation's dependence upon nuclear 
power for its energy needs.
35
 
 If the U.S. is to produce any meaningful, measurable reduction in 
dependence on carbon-based or "fossil" fuels for energy delivery in the near 
future, such an increase in nuclear power will be a key part of that equation.  
However, it has been decades since the last nuclear power facility was 
brought online, and the lengthy process of addressing radioactive waste 
                                                 
 32.  Emma Garrison, Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska: Does a Radioactive Waste 
Compact Nuke Sovereign Immunity?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 449, 450 (2003) (discussing the 
controversy arising out of Nebraska's refusal to grant any of the licenses necessary to build a 
facility after "[t]he Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission . . . voted 
and selected Nebraska to host the [Compact's] regional LLRW disposal facility in 1987"). 
 33.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (declaring the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional in part).  The Court 
held that the monetary and access incentives provided by Congress in order to encourage 
formation of Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compacts were valid 
exercises of power under the Commerce, Taxing, and Spending Clauses of the Constitution.  
Id. at 173–74.  However, the Court held that the "take title"provision, which offered States a 
choice between regulating waste as called for by Congress, or taking possession of  low level 
radioactive waste produced in-state and being held liable for damages incurred by waste 
generators as a result of any failure to do so promptly, was unconstitutional.  Id.  Under the 
"take title" provision, a State could not decline to administer the federal program, it could 
only choose between two alternate applications, a result the court found to be "inconsistent 
with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution."  Id. at 176–77. 
 34. Id. at 149. 
 35. See H. Josef Hebert, Nuclear waste won't be going to Nevada's Yucca Mountain, 
Obama official says, Associated Press, March 6, 2009, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-nuke-
yucca_frimar06,0,2557502.story (reporting the Obama administration's decision to de-fund 
the highly contentious Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository despite the fact that 13.5 
billion dollars had been spent on the project to date) (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 
158 2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 153 (2011) 
disposal and other issues associated with nuclear power will severely 
impact any plans to increase nuclear power generation on the horizon.   
159 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of 








 In 2003, the City of Destin and Walton County set out to correct the 
effects of erosion from multiple hurricanes along approximately seven 
miles of beach within their borders.
1
  Florida‘s Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act
2
 ("the Act") provides such local governments with an 
avenue to restore and maintain eroded beaches through an application and 
permit process.
3
  After the city and county received state approval for the 
restoration project, a group of beachfront property owners brought an 
unsuccessful administrative challenge directly to the state‘s Department of 
Environmental Protection ("FDEP").
4
   
Stop the Beach Renourishment Project, Inc., sued in District Court 
of Appeal for the First Circuit of Florida
5
 arguing that the beach restoration 
project amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
6
  The Court concluded that there 
was a taking; the FDEP‘s actions had deprived the petitioners of two 
property rights:  "(1) the right to receive accretions; and (2) the right to 
have the contact of their property with the water remain intact."
7
  The 
District Court then certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court, 
which concluded that there was no taking, upholding the state's right of 
ownership of the part of the beach added by the process of avulsion.
8
 
                                                 
   Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law 
 1.  See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2600 (2010) (discussing the counties‘ efforts to dredge and replenish approximately 
75 feet of shoreline in the contested areas). 
 2.  See Beach and Shore Preservation Act of 1961, Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011–161.45 
(2007) (setting out the guidelines for municipality and state rights in regards to beach 
restoration). 
 3.  See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599 (discussing the regulatory process in which 
cities and counties can apply for state assistance with beach restoration projects). 
 4.  See id. at 2599–600 (stipulating the administrative process prior to this action). 
 5.  See id. at 2600 (evaluating the relevant procedural posture leading up to the 
Supreme Court‘s ruling on this issue). 
 6.  See id. (establishing the basis for the petitioner‘s case). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See id. at 2611–13 (identifying the final action in the case prior to the United 
States Supreme Court‘s grant of certiorari).  Avulsion occurs when there is a "sudden or 
perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water. . . ."  Id. at 2598 (quoting 
Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 
934, 936 (Fla. 1987)).  Alternatively, "[a]ccretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, 
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 The petitioners then sought review, arguing that the Florida 
Supreme Court‘s decision itself was a taking of their members‘ littoral 
rights.
9
  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, affirmed the 
Florida Supreme Court‘s decision that no taking occurred.  At the outset, it 
is important to note this was a plurality decision.
10
  While the Court 
unanimously agreed that no taking occurred, there was a 4-4 split over 
whether or not a court, through a judicial decision, could deprive a property 
owner of established property rights; and, if so, what standard a court 






Scalia's plurality opinion is supported by prior common law decisions 
in Florida and elsewhere, where the "littoral owner automatically takes title 
to dry land added to his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land 
that has become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of 
the seabed (usually the State)."
12
  When accretion occurs, the property 
boundary becomes the newly calculated mean high-water line.
13
  On the 
other hand, when avulsion adds to property, the new boundary remains at 
the level where the mean high-water line was prior to avulsion.
14
  
                                                                                                                 
or other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water that become 
dry when the water recedes."  Id.  The important distinction, which lies at the heart of this 
case, is that accretions must have occurred "gradually and imperceptibly -- that is, so slowly 
that one could not see the change occurring."  Id. (emphasis added).  It would be extremely 
difficult for the petitioners here to argue that this change was imperceptible.  
 9.  See id. at 2600 (rehashing the argument that petitioners used before the Supreme 
Court). 
 10.  See id. at 2613 (stating that Justice Stevens did not take part in the decision of this 
case). 
 11.  See id. at 2613–19 (summarizing the issue and primary holding of this case).  A 
"judicial taking," in this sense, is a situation where a court decision deprives a property 
owner of a previously held property right.  See id. at 2601–08 (summarizing the history of 
the Takings Clause with respect to the judiciary effecting a taking through its action or 
holding).  Specifically, the property owners in this case argue that the state Supreme Court‘s 
decision will deprive them of the two property rights established by the District Court of 
Appeal:  first, the right to receive accretions to their property; and second, the right to have 
their property maintain its contact with the water.  Id. at 2600. 
 12.  Id. at 2598.  While many other jurisdictions refer more generally to riparian water 
rights, meaning abutting any body of water, the Florida Supreme Court more specifically 
distinguishes between riparian rights and littoral rights.  Id.  The former refers to any body of 
water "abutting a river or stream," while the latter refers to bodies of water "abutting an 
ocean, sea, or lake."  Id. at 2598 n.1 (quoting Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 n.3 (2008)).  The Court here follows the Florida Supreme 
Court‘s terminology in discussing applicable Florida law.  Id. at 2598. 
 13.  See id. at 2599 (summarizing the regulation‘s rule that the property line remains 
the mean high-water line unless changes come through the process of avulsion). 
 14.  See id. at 2598 (outlining the alterative part of the rule that states retain ownership 
of previously owned land added to by avulsion). 
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Importantly, and as the Court holds here, additions to property in this 
manner eliminate the littoral owner‘s right to subsequent accretions.
15
   
What Florida did in this instance amounts to avulsion, not accretion.
16
  
Since the formerly submerged land and foreshore belong to the state, 
accretions no longer directly connect the newly extended shoreline to the 
property owner‘s land, but rather to that of the state.
17
  Thus, a fixed 
"erosion control line" is created as the new permanent property line, as was 
the case here.
18
  Ultimately, the Supreme Court needs to resolve the 
apparent conflict between the state‘s right to fill submerged land adjacent to 
littoral property and the property owners‘ established property rights.
19
 
At length, Scalia addresses the issue of whether or not this type of 
action, termed a "judicial taking," is constitutionally permissible; he posits 
that it is.
20
  First, in order to establish a taking, the Court says that the 
petitioners here would need to show that their "rights to future accretions 
and contact with the water [are] superior to the State‘s right to fill in its 
submerged land."
21
  Further, although the Court affirms the lower court 
decision that such rights are not superior, meaning that no judicial taking 
had in fact occurred, Scalia sets out a test for determining whether such a 
taking is valid for use in future cases.
22
  The "test for a judicial taking . . . 
[is] whether the state court has declare[d] that what was once an established 
right of private property no longer exists."
23
  Scalia goes on to say that 
Justice Breyer‘s reasoning for evaluating a takings claim is faulty because 
"[o]ne cannot know whether a takings claim is invalid without knowing 
what standard it has failed to meet."
24
  In furtherance of this, he cites an 
exhaustive list of cases where the Supreme Court has recognized a right or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15.  See id. at 2610–11 (indicating the legitimate ways in which property rights can be 
taken by government action such as that in the case at hand). 
 16.  See id. at 2598 (analyzing the practical difference between accretion and avulsion). 
 17.  See id. at 2599 (identifying one of the specific property rights that can be "taken" 
in cases such as this).  The foreshore is "the land between the low-tide line and the mean 
high-water line."  Id. at 2598.  Thus, it is the land between the current property boundary and 
the formerly submerged land.  Id.   
 18.  See id. (upholding the regulatory rule that when land is added to by avulsion, the 
previous mean high-water line becomes the permanent property line).  Traditionally, the 
erosion control line is set at the existing mean high-water line.  See id. at 2599 (outlining the 
statutory rules for determining where the erosion control line is).  Technically speaking, 
however, the board can set the erosion control line "seaward or landward of that."  Id. 
 19.  See id. at 2611 (identifying the balancing rights, those of the state and those of 
property owners, at issue in this particular case). 
 20.  See id. at 2602–08 (concluding that "judicial takings" are constitutionally 
permissible under the Fifth Amendment).  
 21.  Id. at 2611. 
 22.  See id. at 2604 (establishing a test for determining when a judicial taking occurs). 
 23.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 24.  Id. at 2603. 
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established a test and then "gone on to find that the claim at issue fails."
25
  
Regardless of either side‘s belief, the test enumerated by Scalia appears to 
be mere dicta due to the lack of a clear majority and the fact that the test 
plays no part in the ultimate holding.  Thus, a future court would need to 




 The first concurring opinion, written by Justice Kennedy and joined 
by Justice Sotomayor, agrees that no taking has occurred here, but disagrees 
with Justice Scalia‘s "judicial takings" analysis.
26
  In any future case where 
a potential judicial taking has occurred, Kennedy suggests that courts must 
first find that "usual principles, including constitutional principles that 
constrain the judiciary like due process," are alone insufficient to uphold 
the rights of property holders.
27
  Only then could a court discuss the 
question of whether a property owner‘s rights have been "taken" by the 
court‘s decision.
28
  Justice Kennedy goes on to discuss the potential issues 
arising out of the concept of judicial taking, if such a thing even exists.
29
  
Specifically, he discusses two issues:  first, it is unclear how a party can 
properly raise such a claim; and second, it is unclear what remedies are 
available to parties after finding a judicial taking.
30
  
                                                 
 25.  See id. (discussing other cases where courts have established tests or recognized 
certain rights, but the underlying claim still fails).  "New Jersey v. T. L. O.,  469 U.S. 325, 
333, 341-343 . . . (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and 
seizures conducted by public-school officials, establishing the standard for finding a 
violation, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687, 689-700 . . . (1984) (recognizing a constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, establishing the test for its violation, but holding the claim at issue failed); Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 . . . (1985) (holding that a Strickland claim can be brought to 
challenge a guilty plea, but rejecting the claim at issue); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
313-320, 326 . . . (1979) (recognizing a due process claim based on insufficiency of 
evidence, establishing the governing test, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390, 395-397 . . . (1926) (recognizing 
that block zoning ordinances could constitute a taking, but holding that the challenged 
ordinance did not do so); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 225, 241, 255-257 . . 
. (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
uncompensated takings, but concluding that the court below made no errors of law in 
assessing just compensation)."  Id. (italics in original). 
 26.  See id. at 2613 (setting out Justice Kennedy‘s reasons for concurring separately). 
 27.  See id. at 2618 (discussing the way that Justice Kennedy would have decided this 
case). 
 28.  See id. at 2613 (suggesting that judicial takings claims must first pass 
constitutional muster before being evaluated under the test established in the majority‘s 
opinion). 
 29.  See id. at 2616–17 (positing potential issues arising out of judicial takings claims). 
 30.  See id. (identifying specifically the two major issues that Justice Kennedy believes 
could arise out of judicial takings claims). 
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 Justice Breyer‘s concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg, gives 
even less credence to judicial takings while still holding that there was no 
taking.
31
  Once the Court arrives at the conclusion that no taking has 
occurred, Breyer states that it is unnecessary to address the constitutional 
issue of whether a judicial decision can affect a taking if there is no just 
compensation.
32
  Simply put, Justice Breyer says, "[t]here is no need now to 
decide more than what the Court decides in Parts IV and V, namely, that the 





IV. Future Implications 
 
 As decided, this case should benefit beach restoration and 
preservation projects across the country.  State ownership of newly dredged 
beaches will create a greater incentive for continuing preservation efforts 
and proper management.  However, from the property owners‘ perspective, 
the state is effectively converting the beach from privately owned property 
to publicly accessible beachfront.
34
 
Conversely, if the Court had decided this case as the petitioner 
supports, states would have a lower incentive to continue preserving 
beaches—why should state tax money provide for preservation of privately 
owned land?  Private beachfront property owners presumably would not 
have sufficient resources to maintain their land as effectively as the state.  It 
seems as though property owners would need to join forces to be able to 
combat the problem, forcing like property owners to pay private 
assessments towards beach preservation efforts. 
 Legal scholars have had some opportunity to comment on the 
outcome of this case, with mixed results.  Some scholars suggest that the 
Court needs to firmly state that "the Takings Clause does not apply to 
judicial decisions."
35
  Others suggest that, while this case is important in the 
realm of property law, it nonetheless "effectively carries no precedential 
                                                 
 31.  See id. at 2618 (setting the basis for Justice Breyer‘s separate concurrence). 
 32.  See id. at 2618–19 (agreeing with Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence that the Court 
should not establish a test for judicial takings when the constitutional question has already 
been answered in the negative). 
 33.  Id. at 2619. 
 34.  See Gary K. Oldehoff, Florida’s Beach Restoration Program Weathers a Storm in 
the Courts:  Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, 84-Nov Fla. B.J. 10, 12 (2010) (summarizing the Stop the Beach opinion from 
the perspective of a local attorney). 
 35.  Judicial Takings, 124 HARV. L. REV. 299, 300 (concluding that our Takings Clause 
jurisprudence should not include judicial takings as allowable). 
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value."
36
  Finally, some see this ruling as "a significant silver lining to an 
ostensibly adverse Supreme Court ruling."
37
  In the long run, as climate 
change continues to affect water levels across the globe, this will be a 
crucial issue with particularly strong implications in coastal states.  
 
                                                 
 36.  Timothy M. Mulvaney, Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory, 24-Dec 
Prob. & Prop. 10, 11 (2010) (analyzing the effect of the Supreme Court‘s decision in the 
Stop the Beach Renourishment case). 
 37.  Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial Takings and Scalia’s Shifting Sands, 35 
VT. L. REV. 423, 435 (2010) (giving the opinions of two scholars who participated in the 
case as amicus curiae). 
